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Securing Commercial Transactions
in the Antebellum
Legal System of Louisiana
By RICHARD KILBOURNE*
INTRODUCTION

Few legal environments in the antebellum period were as
ripe as that of Louisiana for the development of commercial law.
Commercial practices shaped the development of commercial

law, and in principle the law merchant of the United States, (the
customs or usages recognized in commercially important centers
throughout the country) had received complete recognition in
Louisiana in consequence of Louisiana's cession to the Union in
1803.1 However Louisiana was, and remains, the only "mixed"
jurisdiction in the United States, operating under a civil code
drawn primarily from Roman, Spanish, and French sources
which underpins the whole of the state's legal relationships. Thus
as one would expect, the Louisiana Civil Code modified that
state's commercial law, influencing such important particulars as
the status of contracting parties, the theory of contract, and the
security devices regulating debtor-creditor relations. Many argued that this civil law influence was antithetical to the progress
of commercial law, with lawyers asserting that even the protections afforded a wife's separate property were anti-commercial
because they prohibited the husband from either alienating or securing loans with such property.2 Nevertheless, as regards secured transactions, civil law institutions were very flexible and
permitted optimal utility where the security interests of contract. Research Associate, Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
1

See Chaffraix & Agar v. Price, Hine & Tupper, 29 La. Ann. 176 (1877); McDon-

ald v. Millaudon, 5 La. 403, 408 (1833); Barry v. Louisiana Ins. Co., 12 Mart. 493, 497-99

(La. 1822); Talcott v. McKibben, 2 Mart. 298, 304 (La. 1812).
2 W. SAMPSON, SAMPSON'S DISCOURSE AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH VARIOUS LEARNED JURISTS, UPON THE HISTORY OF THE LAW, WITH THE ADDITION OF SEVERAL ESSAYS,

TRACrS, AND DOCUMENTS, RELATING TO THE SUBJEcT 76 (P. Thompson comp. 1822).
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ing parties represented the object at hand.
Commerce in antebellum Louisiana was principally the business of factorage, the practice of commercial agents buying and
selling vast quantities of agricultural commodities. 3 In the course
of their dealings, factors generated an unusually large quantity
of high quality commercial paper which ultimately undeiwrote
Louisiana's system of state charted public banks-a system reputed to be one of the soundest in the United States. 4 It is apparent that this commercial law environment was animated by a
psychology which recognized security as the foremost factor in
appraising risks. In other words, security was the heart of the
commercial transaction, and this commercial environment controlled the evolution of the civil law institutions of suretyship,
mortgage, and pledge.
Security devices in the antebellum commercial environment
played their most significant role in the context of commercial
paper. It is difficult to appreciate the monetary realities of this
period which produced a medium of exchange grounded in commercial paper in the absence of the federal government as guarantor. Personal security, then, was the essence of antebellum
commerce, and credit relations were highly personalized even as
respects the nation as a whole. Most important in securing commercial transactions was the personal surety, and a mere accommodation endorsement on a negotiable promissory note sufficed
to create a suretyship in favor of a bona fide holder. 5 For
example, Baring Brothers' endorsement on a note was enough to
insure that note's negotiability anywhere in the Western world,
and Baring's reputation as London's first commercial house
would be honored even in the wilds of the American frontier.6
Similarly, Nicholas Biddle was able to prolong the life of his
Philadelphia bank many months beyond its actual insolvency by
3

See Ward v. Brandt, 11 Mart. 331, 423-24. See generally H.D.

WOODMAN, KING

COTTON AND His RETAINERS (1968) (describes the cotton factorage business in the South).
4 See G. GREEN, FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE OLD SOUTH: LouisLANA BANING, 1808-1861, at 28-32 (1972).

5 See McGuire v. Bosworth, 1 La. Ann. 248 (1846); Gilbert v. Cooper, 4 Rob. 161
(La. 1843); Guidrey v. Vives, 3 Mart. (n.s.) 659 (La. 1825); Cooley v. Lawrence, 4 Mart.
639 (La. 1817).
6 R. HIDY, THE HOUSE OF BARING IN AMERICAN TRADE AND FINANCE 194-202 (2d ed.
1970).
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exploiting his impeccable reputation with European investors.7
While security was ultimately a matter of personality, other
confirmations of security as the crux of antebellum commercial
realities were recognized in the procedural remedies afforded
creditors when their debtors defaulted. The availability of executory process where the evidence of indebtedness contained a confession of judgment is an example of a security afforded creditors
by means of a procedural remedy.8 Debtor relief legislation,
which was always popular in the western states, usually was
couched in procedural devices also, but Louisiana lawmakers
showed little inclination to upset confidence in the credit system
by availing those who defaulted on their obligations with procedural escapes. 9 This article, however, will concentrate on the
substantive devices available to contracting parties in antebellum
Louisiana to enhance security, and demonstrate the role of the
specie standard in ordinary commercial transactions.
I.
A.

SECUBITY AND THE CIVIL CODE

Development of the PledgeandMortgage

The Louisiana economy in the antebellum period was an important center for national commerce, and one would expect
that the very nature of Mississippi River commerce would shape
the evolution of Louisiana security devices. New Orleans was a
credit center for the entire Mississippi River Valley, in particular
for planters in the Deep South who relied upon New Orleans factors and banks to finance the operation of their plantations from
year to year. The factors themselves were part of an intricate economic system based on national and international commerce and
like the planters, they borrowed heavily through commercial
channels to finance their credit. In this system, each party's ability to liquidate cash advances depended on a marketplace freed
from uncertainties, whether economic or legal.
In the search for eradication of uncertainty in the commer-

7 See B. HAMMOND, BANKs AND POLITICS INAMERICA, 500-13 (1957).
8 LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 732 (1825).

9 See, e.g., Workman, Opinion of the Code ofPractice,Louisiana Advertiser, February 9, 1826.
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cial lending arena, the most widely used security device in antebellum Louisiana was the pledge, a basic form of security in civil
law countries which was virtually indistinguishable from its
common law counterpart. 0 The use of the pledge generally was
restricted to movable property, a distinction which the Louisiana
Civil Code institutionalized and which derived from the evolution of the pledge in the premier civil law jurisdictions of Europe.
Thus, the pledge became the logical security device attendant to
commercial transactions involving negotiable paper, a recognized category of movable property. "x
A central problem with the pledge in antebellum commerce
as it related to negotiable paper was whether such paper was
transferred in the ordinary course of business to liquidate obligations or pledged as collateral security for advances of credit.' 2
Such a distinction was often difficult, if not impossible, to draw
with precision. In one sense, the pledge secures every obligation
existing between a creditor and a debtor in a civil law jurisdiction,' 3 but the application of such a broad principle inevitably
becomes ambiguous when a succession of creditors claim privileges on a debtor's insufficient assets. A transfer of negotiable
paper for a valuable consideration, or in civil law terminology, a
cause, theoretically is free of ambiguity, but the very nature of
credit transactions obscures every certainty upon which men or
business prefer to rely.
This ambiguity was exacerbated by the procedural burden
imposed on businessmen who were parties to a pledge arrangement. Until the decade prior to the Civil War the pledge lacked
the flexibility contemplated by commercial imperatives because
the Louisiana Civil Code required every pledge to be executed in
notarial form. This involved authentication of the pledge before
a notary and two witnesses, and a subsequent recording in the
mortgage records.14 Clearly such requisites were a serious inconvenience to commerce, especially when one observes that at that
time in common law jurisdictions it was possible to effect by pri10

LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1825, 3100-20, 3133-53 (1870).

" Id. art. 3135.

12 See Gray, Macmurdo & Co. v. Lowe, Pattison & Co., 7 La. Ann. 465 (1852).
13 LA. CIV. CODE art. 3183 (1870).

14 Id. art. 3158; id. art. 3125 (1825).
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vate act a pledge of any securities attributable to a course of interrelated transactions, such as collateral securities derived from
a drawing account between two merchants.15 Of course, Louisiana merchants entered into pledge agreements, but their activities were somewhat circumscribed by the burdensome notarial
form required for a valid pledge. The inconveniences associated
with legal requisites for a pledge were greatly mitigated by the
factor's privilege, which will be described later. 16
Merchants, particularly when raising money, certainly were
aware of the formal guidelines surrounding the use of the pledge.
This concern with form was evident in Gray, Macmurdo & Co.
v. Lowe, Pattison & Co., 17 where the issue was whether the
plaintiff had acquired the draft sued on in full ownership or as
collateral security for the repayment of a loan. The Court outlined the historical inconvenience of the procedural requirements
surrounding the pledge when it observed that formerly the Civil
Code
prevented the circulation of negotiable paper, by way of
pledge or security, and limited its negotiability to cases of sale
or discount, in which the property in the paper was absolutely
transferred, unless the forms, required by the code, were observed in the contract. These forms, men of business, in their
transactions, had neither time nor inclination to observe, and
the consequence was, of necessity a resort to some other legal
mode, in which negotiable paper could be made available for
the ordinary purposes of trade and exchange. Hence, for the
purpose of raising money on a note, which was not to be transferred absolutely, it was sold with a privilege reserved by the
owner to redeem it within a certain time.
These articles of the code, after having been a most serious
incumberance to commerce, were, by common consent, repealed at the last session of the Legislature. 18
The articles that had been repealed, however, were in force
at the time the dispute between the merchant houses of Gray and
15

Fletcherv. Morey, 9 F. Cas. 266 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 4, 864).
16 See notes 39-53 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of factors and
vendors privileges.
1 7 La. Ann. 465 (1852).
18Id. at 465.
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Lowe arose. A third party, also a New Orleans merchant house
which had since suspended payments, had received money from
the plaintiffs and for this favor had agreed to "sell a certain
amount of paper [which paper obligated the defendant], reserving the right of repurchasing this paper at a stipulated price on a
given day."' 19 This method of raising money in the market place
was very typical of the credit facilities New Orleans merchants
afforded each other. The redemption period for such "loans"
rarely exceeded thirty days, during which time it was possible for
the holder of redeemable paper to utilize it to collateralize other
unrelated credit transactions. A witness who testified for the
plaintiff regarding transactions of this kind noted that he
did not understand the transaction to be a loan, with the paper
left as collateral security. I would not have made a loan on a
pledge of the paper as collateral security; on the first transaction with Greenland, Mr. Macmurdo consulted me about the
matter, and I told him, that a loan on pledge of paper would
not be legal, and that he must have a sale of the paper ....20
The defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim to the paper
was faulty in that it was impossible to determine by which of a
series of contracts between the plaintiff and the holder the
former had acquired the draft in contention. The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, did not find such reasoning persuasive,
observing that to countenance such an argument "would establish a precedent which would operate a check upon a free and
fair circulation of negotiable paper, and [would] be an innova2
tion of the law as well as of the usages of trade in that article." 1
It should be noted that the pledge underpins all forms of security in the Louisiana Civil Code, whether it be the pledge itself, the mortgage, or suretyship. The characteristics which distinguish the security devices relate primarily to the nature of the
property burdened with an encumbrance and not to general
principles regulating the security acquired by a pledgee. The
pledge, as previously noted, is associated with movable property,
whereas the mortgage is identified with immovable property.
19 Id. at
2

21

466.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 472.
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Suretyships, on the other hand, effectuate loans of credit by contracting a third party's personal security for the benefit of a creditor. The pledge-like qualities common to all security devices in
the Louisiana Civil Code were especially relevant in the antebellum period, a time when sensitivity to general commercial principles and their practical application in everyday commercial
transactions was explicit in judicial rulings. 2
For example, one can observe in this regard the utilization of
the mortgage. One of the most creative uses made of the mortgage in antebellum Louisiana-in keeping with the Civil Code's
use of security to further commercial transactions-involved financing the capital of the state's several land banks. George D.
Green has presented an excellent account of the political and economic environment which fostered this unique innovation in his
Financeand Economic Development in the Old South, 2 but it is
important to notice some of the particulars relative to securities
created in connection with financing banking capital. The acts of
the legislature incorporating such banks as the Consolidated Association of Planters, the Citizens' Bank, and the Union Bank all
contained provisions for financing capital through the instrumentality of bonds secured by mortgages on real estate. 24 A subscriber to capital stock would execute a mortgage on real estate in
favor of the bank, resulting in stock subscriptions being financed
with loans secured by mortgages on stockholders' real estate. The
Act incorporating these banks also provided that mortgages thus
received were thereby pledged to the bond holders to secure the
redemption of their debentures, thus obviating the necessity of
complying with the formalities required by the Civil Code.
Every stockholder on depositing and pledging his certificate of
stock was "entitled to a credit equal to one-half of the total
amount of his stock." ' The charters of these banks, contemplat-

22

See, e.g., Matthews, Finley & Co. v. C.M. Rutherford, 7 La. Ann. 225 (1852).

23 See C. GREEN, supra note4, at 109, 130-31.
24 An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the consolidated association of planters of

Louisiana, 1827 La. Acts, 1st Sess. 96; An Act to incorporate the Subscribers to the Union
Bank of Louisiana, 1832 La. Acts, 3d Sess. 42; An Act to incorporate the Citizens' Bank of

Louisiana, 1833 La. Acts, 1st Sess. 172.
25 An Act to Incorporate the Citizens' Bank of Louisiana § 11, 1833 La. Acts, 1st
Sess. 172, 180.
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ing "loans of money ... on mortgages, [and] discounts [of commercial paper] on the faith of mortgages," contained one very
significant provision which permitted married women to obligate themselves jointly and in solido with their husbands "to renouice, cede, mortgage and hypothecate her rights, privileges,
or property, as well dotal as of any other nature of kind whatever." 26 This provision constituted a wholesale exception to
Louisiana's matrimonial regime law, which at that time segregated the married woman's separate property from the husband's
patrimony and prohibited her from binding herself for her husband's debts contracted by him before or during the marriage. 2
Even her dotal property, which was protected to the extent that
the husband's creditors could not look to it to satisfy their claims,
could be mortgaged, thus augmenting the husband's capacity to
borrow. The provision, no doubt, pleased those with a commercial bias who regarded Louisiana's civil law as "too anti-commercial." This represents another legal effort in antebellum Louisiana to lend greater security to commercial transactions under
the Civil Code.
CommercialPaperas a CollateralSecurity

B.

Against this backdrop of the evolution of the pledge as a legal
tool to promote security in commercial dealings one can perceive
the significant role played by commercial paper in the commercialization of antebellum Louisiana.
The importance of commercial paper as security was amply
elucidated in the early case of King v. Gayoso,ss wherein the
Louisiana Supreme Court noted:
To pledge a note, is, therefore, to make a legitimate use of it.
In the usual course of business, notes and bills of exchange are
used to pay debts, make purchases or raise money by discount
or pledge. He, therefore, who gives a bill or note, authorizes
the use of it for any of those purposes, and must know, by such
a disposal of it, the payee will enable the endorsee to repel any
26
27

d. §25, at 190.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2398 (1870).

2

8 Mart. (n.s.) 370 (La. 1829).
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claim of the maker, on the score of want of consideration, con-

cealment, or compensation.

9

Commercial paper's importance as security was especially conspicuous in the relations of factor and planter, and it may therefore be helpful to describe a series of hypothetical transactions involving the use of commercial paper as security.
The most basic transaction was one where the planter gave
the factor a mortgage on his plantation for future endorsements,
the mortgage thus securing the factor's endorsements of promissory notes to be made by the planter at a later time. 30 The factor
furnished credit to the planter, which usually was accomplished
with either a draft on the factor or a promissory note made by the
planter and endorsed by the factor. In the latter instance, the
factor was treated as an accommodation endorser or surety and
hence solidary liability was established with the planter under
the rules governing suretyship. The factor either pledged the
promissory note or discounted it to secure his own credit.
Between planter and factor, and between factors, it was
common to advance credit by means of a promissory note which
had no other security than the maker's personal guarantee. The
lender gave his paper to the borrower, who negotiated it in the
marketplace with or without an endorsement, depending on the
credit-worthiness of the maker. It was not uncommon for the
planter to assist the factor in obtaining credit by means of a
promissory note secured by a mortgage on the plantation, which
the factor subsequently negotiated. 3' Negotiability and discounting were controlled largely by the conditions of the marketplace;
thus, even impeccable credit would not insure a sale of paper at
par value. Thus, it can be seen that the pledge of collaterals was
an important alternative to discounting, and in a real sense the
pledging of collaterals was equivalent to a loan secured by an obligation.

2

Id. at 374.

30 See Brander v. Bowmai3 , 16 La. 374 (1840); Bauduc v. His Creditors, 4 La. 247

(1832); Roussel v. Dukeylus Syndics, 4 Mart. 329 (La. 1816), LA. CIV. CODE art. 3292
(1870).
31 Commissioners of the Merchants Bank v. Etienne Cordeviolle, 4 Rob. 506 (La.
1843); Yard & Blois' Syndics v. Srodes, 9 La. 479 (1836).
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The paper market created by these transactions resulted in
varied consequences but it is important to note that its ramifications rarely surpassed the personalities identified with evidences
of indebtedness. A particular kind of security might flow from
beneath the waves of paper daily negotiated in the New Orleans
money market, but throughout personal reputation remained the
critical focus of this turbulent sea, and it is a mistake to assume
that collaterals alone mounted the most prominent tier in this
pyramiding structure. One judge of the New Orleans commercial court admonished London's merchants "to make the necessary enquiries before accepting paper drawn by merchants unfamiliar to them." 32 At another extreme, a prominent New Orleans
merchant was reluctant to raise a defense of usury, although confronted with a flagrant violation of the state's usury prohibition,
for fear of harming his reputation in the financial community:
In opening the argument on the question of usury, the
counsel for [the merchant] Hagan, aware that his plea is usually an odious one in public opinion, and is also scanned with
something like disfavor by courts of equity, has defended the
reputation of his client, by suggesting that Hagan has never
sought to invalidate, as he says he might successfully have
done, the claim of the Canal Bank for its full debt of $12,000,
and eight per cent interest, and that he has only taken refuge
under this plea, at a late period of the trial, to aid himself in resisting a vigorous effort made by his adversary to impose upon
him a personal liability for debts amounting, in principal alone
to $67,510, and bought by his antagonists for $470. This is a
question which concerns the reputation of Hagan, rather than
the legal merits of this controversy; but it is perhaps just to say
in passing, that the remarks of the counsel with regard to his
client's motives and conduct, seem justified by the record.33
Thus, it is evident that the antebellum Louisiana legal system reorganized and relied upon emphasis in the commercial world
upon the credit reputation of commercial actors. This recognition served to enhance security in the marketplace against the
backdrop of a Civil Code often antithetical to the realities of

32

Lanfear v. Blossman, 1 La. Ann. 148, 157(1846).

33 New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Hagan, 1 La. Ann. 62, 66 (1846).
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commercial intercourse. A similar prejudice against availing
one's self of legal recourse, which was shared by merchants generally, will be discussed in connection with the specie standard
and its relationship with commercial paper.3
In this regard, one should emphasize the legal atmosphere
surrounding bills of exchange which were an extremely important feature of the New Orleans money market, particularly in financing the credit of factors. Planters not only deposited promissory notes with their factors to enable them to raise money, but
also frequently drew bills of exchange payable to third parties
who then endorsed them in blank. A factor upon whom such a
bill was drawn accepted it before maturity and negotiated it in
the money market, frequently receiving another merchant's accommodation paper. The Louisiana Supreme Court observed in
Greenwoodv. Lowe & Pattison that such cross acceptances "for
mutual accommodation" were typical in the New Orleans money
market, and further noted that:
To a lawyer, applying to such a case, the technical doctrines which govern in the general the contracts of a bill of exchange, or perhaps to a foreign merchant, the transaction
would seem anomalous. For as a general rule, when a bill gets
into the hands of the acceptor, the contract is functus officio.
But this seeming incongruity is explained by the common
course of business in New Orleans, with which every merchant
here is familiar, and to which it would be unreasonable for us
to shut our eyes, since it has so frequently been illustrated by
our records in commercial cases. The planters, as a class, are in
constant need of advances; the New Orleans factors as a class,
are in as constant need of discounts. Out of this state of things,
has arisen the notorious practice of the factor receiving from
the planter his bill on the factor, which the latter accepts, and
gets discounted in the market, puts the proceeds to the
planter's credit, and looks to the promised shipment of his
crops to place the acceptor in funds to meet the bill. Acceptances to the amount of many hundreds of thousands of dollars, are thus, we have no doubt, thrown into the New Orleans

34 See the text accompanying notes 89-90 infra for a further discussion of the prejudice against merchants who brought their commercial disputes into court.
5 7 La. Ann. 197 (1852).
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bill market annually. 36
The issue of whether the plaintiff in that case had received the
defendant's paper in bad faith via another merchant was so
hopelessly intertwined with the factual situation in the money
market that the case was remanded for the taking of further evidence and for a new trial by a jury of merchants, as it was "desirable to know what a jury of merchants would think in a matter of
this sort, which involves a question of mercantile good faith."a
The Louisiana Supreme Court thus showed itself as being very
sensitive to economic conditions and market realities, indicating
an awareness of the pressures which existed "at frequently recurring intervals in the New Orleans money market, and of the precarious character of certain classes of mercantile paper." a
C.

Factor'sand Vendor's Privileges

If Louisiana's early legal system was inflexible in the area of
security because it refused to allow a pledge of securities resulting
from a series of transactions to be effected by private act and
without a physical delivery of those securities, the practical effect
of the factor's privilege in large measure compensated for this deficiency. In the Louisiana civil law system, a privilege is a right
of preference which arises by operation of law. A factor's privilege was reflected in the fact that the factor was completely secure for the advances he had made to a consignor during the
course of a year, provided he had in his possession property consigned to him by the consignor, or provided he could show a bill
of lading or a letter of advice which indicated that the property
had indeed been dispatched to him. This privilege extended to
the unpaid price of goods that the factor had sold for the planter
on credit and it was applicable to a general balance of account,
not being restricted to specific advances made on particular consignments.3 9
A problem developed, however, when the factor's privilege
36

Id. at 197-98.

3 Id. at 200.
31 Id. at 199.

39 Gray, Durrive & Co. v. Bledsoe, 13 La. 489 (1839); LA. CIv.
(1870); LA. CiV. CODE art. 3214 (1825).

CODE

art. 3247
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and the vendor's privilege on movables arose simultaneously and
encumbered the same consignment of goods. Competing privileges were likely to arise when a merchant was in failing circumstances, had possession of property consigned to him by a planter
or other merchant, and had drawn bills of exchange on a third
party, thus effectuating a sale of the consigned property. In the
latter transaction, often the buyer was a commission merchant,
entitled to a factor's privilege on all acceptances made on account of the consignor-merchant. The consignor was deemed to
have lost control over the property upon remittance of the bill of
lading to the consignee, but'often the only evidence of a transfer
of ownership was a warehouse receipt. Frequently, too, bills of
lading were attached to bills of exchange and brokered in the
New Orleans money market, thus substantially increasing the
likelihood of their being sold to innocent third parties buying on
the faith of the collaterals. But, such transactions appear to have
contained few if any pitfalls, because "[a]ccording to the course
of trade [in New Orleans], the bill of exchange drawn on a particular shipment, accompanied by the bill of lading, usually represents the price of property sold, or the means of re-imburse0
ment of the price to some party."4
Generally, Louisiana courts in the antebellum period resolved this dilemma by recognizing that it was more equitable
that a vendor who delivered possession of his property to a vendee without being paid for it "should suffer by the acts of the
vendee, than that a third person who made advances upon the
faith of the vendee's possession should lose by it."'4 This judicial
posture was evident in Lee & Ritchie v. Galbraith,'42 where the
plaintiff argued effectively that the "lien" of the consignee did
not exist, because the merchandise had not been consigned to the
intervenors for sale, and that the vendor's privilege of the plaintiff was still in force, since the defendant-vendee still had possession of the goods. The intervenors had, however, made advances
on the goods in the vendee's possession and certainly seemed to
satisfy most of the criteria for entitlement to a factor's privilege,

Fetter v. Field, 1 La. Ann. 80, 82-83 (1846).
See Lee & Ritchie v. Galbraith, 5 La. Ann. 343, 349 (1850).
42 Id.
40
41
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except that the transaction more or less resembled a sale.
In addition, the plaintiff relied upon the Civil Code pledge
provisions by arguing that the intervenor also was not a pledgee,
although he held warehouse receipts for the property, because
"the act required by article 3125" had not been executed4 3 To
support this position, he cited Erwin v. Torrey, 44 a case which involved a conflict of privileges between a vendor and a factor who
had made advances, and the plaintiff further noted that in Fetter
v. Field45 "the fact of possession, and the change of possession according to the usual course of business" was decisive in determining whether the vendor's or the factor's privilege would prevail.4
Counsel for the defendant-intervenor, however, presented an excellent brief which argued for recognition of commercial realities:
On what principle, then, of commercial law or of public
policy, can it be held that the defendants should, on this account, forfeit their privilege on the property? The object of the
law in conceding a privilege to commission merchants for their
advances, is to facilitate commercial transactions, by enabling
the holders of property to obtain money upon it in advance of
the sale, and thus wait a favorable market.
It will not be denied that it is altogether repugnant to this
system to incumber commercial transactions with the formalities of the contract of pledge, as required by the code. It is true
that the system has not been fully recognized and uniformly
upheld by the courts of this State. In some instances it has been
marred and impaired by the application of the provisions of
the code to cases, to which it is believed they were never intended to apply, and where such application has produced
nothing but mischief and confusion. In other instances, the inconvenience and evil consequences of such an infringement of
the commercial law, as recognised by all other States, were so
obvious and glaring that even the positive enactments of the
code were made to yield to the "customs of merchants." The

43

Id. at 343-46 (arguments of counsel).

44 8 Mart. 90 (La. 1820), cited by counsel in 5 La. Ann. at 344.
45 1 La. Ann. 80 (1846), cited by counsel in 5 La. Ann. at 344.
46

1 La. Ann. at 84, quoted by counsel in 5 La. Ann. at 344.
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result has been that our commercial system, if we may be said
to have a commercial system, is deformed and incongruous.
But in recent cases the courts have evidently sought to restore
our jurisprudence to a conformity with the Commercial Code
of the other States. The present case presents another opportunity to decide whether commercial contracts in this State shall
be decided according to the Commercial Law, which has been
so often held to be in force, or shall continue subject to the
doubts and perplexities of conflicting systems of jurispru47
dence.
The Louisiana Supreme Court took a rather restrictive view
of commercial realities and held that the plaintiff-vendor's delivery of the property to the vendee had been injudicious.48 Therefore, the intervenors' claim was proclaimed the superior one and
the Court thereby struck a blow for legal recognition of commercial realities. At the same time, it seems likely that, but for the
transfer of the warehouse receipts to the intervenor, the vendor's
privilege would have prevailed; nevertheless, neither conclusion
resulted in a uniform rule to what was essentially a practical dilemma in the context of commercial realities.
The court's decision was bound to introduce a new consideration, premised upon caution, in business transactions between buyers and sellers in the marketplace. A variety of rules
were developed to match transfer of possession with commercial
realities, and it is significant that possession alone became the
critical factor in analyzing commercial transactions. This point is
particularly important because, under Louisiana's law of sale,
transfer of ownership takes place at the moment the parties agree
to the sale and a physical transfer of possession is not necessary to
invest the vendee with ownership. 4 9 Thus, the position of a third
party dealing with the vendee is strengthened considerably in relation to the original vendor. Nevertheless, in the case of Campbell v. Penn,-° possession was deemed to be the controlling criterion and hinged in this instance on whether a transfer between
vendor and vendee was recorded on the black book of the cotton
47 5 La. Ann. at 346-47 (arguments of counsel).
48 Id. at 349.
49
LA. CIV. CODE. art. 2456 (1870).
So 7 La. Ann. 371 (1852).
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press where the goods had been placed by a broker for trans-shipment. 51This result was reached despite the fact that there was no
want "of good faith in these transactions, on the part of either the
plaintiff or intervenors. One or the other... [had to] suffer, by
the frauds of an unfaithful cotton speculator." 52 The dissenting
justice wrote most convincingly that the plaintiffs had advanced
money to the fraudulent speculator "upon the faith of the property, of which he had substantially the apparent control," and
that therefore the vendee had "for purposes of commerce" actual
possession of the property.a5 It is worth noting that, although the
Louisiana Supreme Court reached a result of effecting a division
of the cotton between vendor and consignor, more appropriate to
the wisdom of Solomon than the exigencies of commerce, a
strong tendency to protect good faith third parties was still discernible, especially where the vendor failed to appreciate a usage
of commerce, such as in the case of cotton where a transfer of
possession was required to be placed on the black book of the cotton presses.

II.

THE SPECIE STANDARD AND COMMERCIAL PAPER:

THEIR IMPORT FOR THE CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS
ON MONIED OBLIGATIONS
Most historians concerned with the operation of the specie
standard in the nineteenth century have focused on the area of
banking. While banking was an important index of monetary
stability, as evidenced by bank charters which specifically provided for convertibility of notes into specie, it is important to
recognize that bank notes served simply as a buttress for a monetary system grounded upon commerce. Bank notes merely supplemented the money supply and, like bills of exchange and
promissory notes, were a type of commercial paper.To understand the monetary system in the last century, one
must realize that the federal government regulated that system,
51

Id. at 373.

52

Id. at 372.

dissenting).
53Id. at 376 (Slidell, J.,
5 See R. TIMBERLAKE, THE OfICINS OF CENTRAL BANKINC INTHE UNITED STATES 31,

187(1978).
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for the most part, only when necessary to finance the exigencies
of government in times of war. Generally, control of the monetary system was in private hands and the composition of the
money supply was reflected in traditional instruments of commerce. Thus, as might be expected the monetary system appears
to have been fairly susceptible to commercial pressures, and the
fact that commercial paper constituted such a large part of the
money supply resulted in a certain symbiotic relationship between money and commerce.5
In the context of our analysis of the legal responses to the
Civil Code's structure in the areas of commercial security, we
will consider the operation of the specie standard relative to commercial paper and the significance of specie convertibility for the
Louisiana Civil Code articles on monied obligations. In particular, Article 1935, which appears to limit damages to legal interest where there has been a delay in the performance of an obligation to pay money,O will be placed in its historical context to reflect a contemporary monetary system that responded to currency fluctuations and changes in the course of trade, both internationally and between regions of the United States. Thus, it will
be shown that a vast area of consequential damages, which resulted from monetary dislocations, remained outside the Civil
Code's regulatory scheme. Legislative efforts to control consequential damages which flowed from the monetary environment, were few and always futile in their attempts to alleviate
hardships.
Money and Credit

A.

In antebellum Louisiana, the money supply was composed of
gold and silver coins, governmental obligations, and, most importantly, commercial paper, i.e., bills of exchange, promissory
notes, checks, drafts, and bank notes. The most familiar form of
commercial paper in everyday transactions were bank notes,
which had much the same appearance of a present day federal
reserve note. Issues of state chartered institutions were by law
5

4Id.

56 LA. CIV. CODE art. 1935 (1870).
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convertible into specie on demand, and the presence of a convertibility provision in most bank charters indicated contemporary
acknowledgement of the specie standard's subsuming influence
in the monetary system. The role of bank notes in the monetary
system has been thoroughly documented by banking historians,s
but for the purpose of our study it is important to remember that
bank notes merely represented another kind of commercial
paper.
Banking historians have appreciated the role of the Second
Bank of the United States in stabilizing exchanges within the
United States and in providing a medium of exchange that approximated a uniform national currency. The extent to which
this institution represented a hybrid of banking functions, whether central or commercial in their character, should suggest
that, while the Second Bank was the largest bank in the antebellum period, it was not deserving of the denomination "Central
Bank." 59 Nicholas Biddle, after all, prided himself on associating
the Bank's vast discounting operations with the commercial
paper market, ® but after the demise of the Second Bank, note
circulations throughout the country were largely localized, rarely passing between regions except to perform a clearinghouse
function.6'
The only form of commercial paper which circulated between regions of the United States in the antebellum period was
the bill of exchange. This most important instrument of commercial credit was not only the sustenance of commercial banking
but was also a key stabilizing influence in the monetary system.
The strength of New Orleans banks, for example, in the antebellum period has been associated with the huge volume of trade acceptances generated by commerce passing through the port, and
bank-note issues themselves were tied to the banking system's discounting of bills of exchange.
This vital role of bills of exchange was especially accented in
57 See R.TIMBERLAKE,supra note 54, at 14-16, 90-91, 132.

" See id. for an example of documentation of the role of bank notes in the 19th century monetary system.
5'See id.
at 212-13.
60 See id. at 30-32.
61 See generally id. at 40-41.
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the commercial lending arena. The commercial banking system,
which comprised most of the Louisiana banking industry in the
antebellum period, could facilitate short-term loans of credit but
not long-term loans. Even six months was considered a lengthy
period for a loan of credit via a bill of exchange, although the system did permit some flexibility in the form of redrafts. Longterm loans secured by mortgages on real estate, as they exist today, were practically non-existent, except where such loans were
negotiated through private channels. 62 The importance of personal credit for financing business ventures has yet to be fully appreciated. Similarly, merit will be found in the supposition that
the absence of a uniform, stable currency in the last century contributed to the difficulty of financing long-term loans through
the banking system.
B.

Damageson ProtestedBills of Exchange

The failure of the drawee of a bill to accept or pay the bill at
maturity resulted in the holder's protesting the instrument and
demanding payment either from an immediate endorser or from
the drawer. The particulars governing acceptance and payment,
a formal protest in notarial form, and whether the drawee had to
proceed against his immediate endorser or might choose instead
to sue the maker were governed by a complex structure of legal
rules which varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Much valuable information concerning the conditions of antebellum commerce may be discovered by mastering specialized rules, such as
the ones controlling notice of protest, but the purpose of our
study is to elucidate an historical perception that all forms of
commercical paper derived their index of value from the specie
standard.
This perception is evident when one considers that the par of
exchange utilized in international transactions was affected by
"any discrepancy between the actual weight or fineness of the
coins, or of the bullion for which the substitutes used in' their

62

See generally G. GREEN, supra note4, at 29-30, 66-67, 115-16.
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place [would] . .. exchange, . . . [and] by any sudden increase
'
or diminution of the bills drawn in one country upon another."
The cost of conveying bullion from one country to another
formed the limit within which trade imbalances might fluctuate,
and the value of a bill of exchange purchased in the money market for remittance purposes likewise reflected monetary fluctuations. Thus, we can see that par value formed the center of oscillations created by trade imbalances, with species costs determining, in theory, the outermost limits of such fluctuations.6
Damages on protested bills of exchange were made to depend, not only on the course of trade between countries or between regions in the United States, but also on currency fluctuations. Justice Story was emphatic about this point in his seminal
treatise on bills of exchange, observing that the principal sum
was ascertained by "its true or par value at the place of acceptance or payment," so that any fluctuations in the relative value
of currencies would be compensated for when determining the
extent of damages. 5 In this regard, damages were determined by
the rate of re-exchange, i.e., the cost of a bill drawn in the country where the acceptance was to have been made on a country
where either a drawer or an endorser resided. The re-exchange
value contemplated the costs to the holder commensurate with
losses resulting from damage to his credit resulting from his reliance on the protested bill, his issuance of paper against it, and his
inability to honor such obligations as they matured. There was
no burden on the holder to prove actual losses: re-exchange in
theory precluded any possibility of the holder suffering any loss
by permitting him to draw on the endorser or drawer for the true
value of the protested bill without regard to the costs of negotiating such a bill in the marketplace. The holder, then, was entitled
to draw on the endorser or drawer for the par value of the protested bill, but the costs of negotiating such a bill depended on
the par of exchange (equalization of monetary units of value),
the course of exchange (stability and fluctuations in trade be6 J.R. MCCULLOCH, 1 A DICTONARY, PRIcIncAL, THEORETICAL, AND HIsroRcAL,
OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL NAVIGATION 657 (H. Vethake ed. 1853).
64

ld.

65 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANCE, FOREIGN AND IN-

LAND §§ 30-31 (1843).

1981-82]

COMMON LAW SECURED TRANSACTIONS

tween countries), and the credit-worthiness of drawer or endorser. 0 With regard to credit-worthiness, certainly there were
instances when a drawer's credit was so impeccable that a third
party came forward and payed the protested bill for his honor.
There are indications that, when a third party paid for the honor
of the endorser, the endorser still was entitled to claim from the
drawer damages that were attributable to trade fluctuations and
monetary depreciations. The allowance of such damages was
premised on the sound argument that the endorser's credit resources, which might otherwise have been employed in profitable pursuits, had been used in the drawer's behalf. 67
It may perhaps be difficult to comprehend the justice of a
system which meted out exorbitant financial penalties to drawers
and endorsers of dishonored bills of exchange. However, it is important to reflect on the tenuous character of antebellum credit
resources and remember that commercial credit was a prerogative of the wealthy. It is important as well that the credit system
of the last century lacked the multifarious dimensions of a consumer oriented society. In that light, credit was too precious not
to deserve every safeguard, and most certainly antebellum businessmen first examined the security interests guarding their
transactions and then assayed the risks involved in their enterprises.
C.

LegislationRespecting Ratesfor Damages

Attempts were made throughout the antebellum period to
limit the scope of damages on bills of exchange protested for nonpayment. Every state, including Louisiana, adopted laws specifying a percentage of the bill's true value as liquidated damages
in lieu of re-exchange. It is difficult to imagine how such laws,
which varied among jurisdictions within the United States, effectuated desirable outcomes if the parties to bills of exchange had
to assay yet another factor in computing the costs of credit. These
early attempts to soften the harsh effects of the specie standard in
6

Id.

67 See Bank of the United States v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 711, 737-38

(1844).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70

commerce resulted from and were sensitive to the hardships
caused by monetary inflexibility; yet, specie was an essential element for securing credit and it seems naive to suppose that legislative specification of damages successfully ameliorated the impact of fluctuations in the course of exchanges, whether between
regions in the United States or in international commerce.
Furthermore, the legislators completely failed to appreciate
the realities of bank-note depreciations and their connection with
the marketplace. The stability of bank-note issues in the nation's
commercial cities was grounded in the traffic in bills of exchange; thus, fluctuations in the course of trade affected a bill's
redemption in current funds and in the most exaggerated circumstances hastened redemption in specie. Given the scarcity of
specie in a panic environment, bills, too were also likely to depreciate in value, thereby imposing an additional hardship for the
drawer who was legally bound to reimburse the holder of the
protested bill in specie or its equivalency in current bank notes.
Louisiana's first law dealing with bills protested for non-payment was enacted in 1805, during the territorial period. That
legislation distinguished between a bill drawn or endorsed in
Louisiana upon a person in a foreign country and one which was
drawn on a person in another state. In the case of the former,
damages were fixed at twenty percent "and so in proportion for
any greater or less sum, in the same specie as the said bill or bills
were drawn, or current money of their territory, equivalent to
that which was first paid by the drawer or endorser."8 Apparently, the legislation contemplated depreciating currencies that
were particularly aggravated in the foreign trade.
When bills drawn or endorsed upon persons elsewhere in the
United States had been duly protested for non-payment, they
were subject to a ten percent charge for damages, but no mention was made of equalizing currencies, an omission for which a
plausible explanation suggests itself. Bills drawn in dollars and
payable in the United States were redeemable in gold and silver;
similarly, specie also protected bills which were payable in the
currency of a banking institution, because banking charters con-

68 An Act Concerning Bills of Exchange and for other purposes, 1804 Acts of the Territory of Orleans, 1st Sess. 96.
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trolled note issues with convertibility provisions. The Louisiana
legislation, then, contemplated damages as compensation for
fluctuations in the course of trade. Currency depreciations affected all types of commercial paper, but it is fairly easy to discern that the specie standard was perceived as the ultimate security for the immutability of contracts.
Legislative solutions for economic exigencies seem always to
be localized and at best suppressive of the most egregious features
of eroding fortune, and this maxim was certainly true regarding
damages or protested bills of exchange. Louisiana's legislation on
damages was revised in 1838, no doubt in response to the pernicious effects of the 1837 panic which had its origins in the AngloAmerican trade. The panic severely damaged the credit of all
major houses on both sides of the Atlantic and left in its wake a
voluminous number of bills drawn on England which were protested for non-payment. 61 Political realities demanded some form
of relief for Louisiana's men of business, who daily confronted
the realities of falling prices, local bank-note depreciations, and
vanished credit. In response to this situation, damages on foreign
and domestic bills were reduced by half, to ten percent and five
percent respectively. The matter of depreciating currencies,
whether foreign or domestic, was addressed specifically, and it is
indicative of the times that the legislature deemed it proper to
provide for varying domestic rates of exchange, a provision absent from earlier legislation.
Sect. 3. [I]f the contents of such bill be expressed in the
money of account of the United States, the amount of the principal and of the damages herein allowed for the non-acceptance or non-payment shall be ascertained and determined,
without any reference to the rate of exchange existing between
this State and the place on which such bill shall have been
drawn at the time of the demand on payment or notice of nonacceptance or non-payment.
Sect. 4. [I]f the contents of such bill be expressed in the
money of account or currency of any foreign country, then the
principal as well as the damages payable thereon, shall be ascertained and determined by the rate of exchange, but when6 A survey of the Commercial Court records reveals that approximately 80% of the

cases tried involved dishonored evidences of indebtedness.
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ever the value of such foreign coin is fixed by the laws of the
United States then the value thus fixed shall prevail. 70
While the Louisiana legislature and other state legislatures
sought local solutions to this problem, chambers of commerce
throughout the country often asked Congress during the antebellum period to enact a law establishing uniform rates of damages
for bills drawn and payable in the United States. Congressional
reluctance to proceed in this manner can only be understood by
putting aside the seasonal trade variations between regions, the
ostensible reason for such a regulation, and focusing on the subject of damages and the implications for the monetary system of a
law fixing uniform rates of damages. A law regulating damages
would have required the federal government to substantiate a
paper currency suitable for the conduct of commercial affairs.
An integral part of damages was the costs of currency fluctuations, and some kind of uniform medium of exchange in which
commercial men could invest their resources and receive value
was essential. One memorial noted that among Congress'
powers, which seemed to substantially involve the right of legislating uniform damages, was the power to coin money and regulate its value. 71 Early in the nation's history, Alexander Hamilton had observed that dealing in bills was "literally a branch or
form of the commerce in money between distant states and nations." 72 There appears, however, to have been much distrust of
attempts to regulate the money supply, and certainly the war
waged between the proponents of the Second Bank and Andrew
Jackson only aggravated that distrust, especially for a national
banking system capable of supporting a uniform medium of exchange. The central banking functions which the Second Bank
had performed indeed paled against the background of its commercial banking functions, which constituted its chief operation
in the American economy, 73 and the supposition that the Second
Bank regularized exchanges and provided a fairly uniform na-

7

0An Act to regulate the damages on protested Bills of Exchange, 1837 La. Acts, 2d.

Sess. 44.
7'H.R. REP.No. 135,19th Cong., 1st Sess 7 (1826).
72 Id.
73
See B. HAMMoND,supranote 7,at 300-12.
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tional currency in the form of non-depreciating bank notes must
be modified in light of the memorials addressed to Congress specifically requesting legislation to regularize rates for damages on
bills protested for non-payment.
D.

The Louisiana Judiciary's Response To Depreciating Currencies

The extent to which Louisiana courts honored the specie
standard in fixing the value of monied obligations is not clear,
primarily because the instances are few where litigation elucidated at all a particular sensitivity to value and the specie standard. For example, an extreme position appears to be the one
taken by one judge of the New Orleans commercial court who,
when confronted with a determination of value in Louisiana currency of a contract negotiated in depreciated Mississippi bank
notes, responded by establishing a scale of depreciation. 74Most of
the cases reported from the state Supreme Court which have any
bearing on the subject involve Mississippi contracts, but they are
not particularly enlightening relative to the specie standard because the bank notes of that state were wholly depreciated. Representative in this regard was the decision of Wilson v. Lambeth, 75 where the state Supreme Court merely affirmed without
comment a lower court decision that the defendants had the burden of proving a depreciation in New Orleans notes at the maturity of a bill of exchange payable in current city notes. The plaintiffs argued that at the maturity of the bill and the time of the
suit the notes were "at par and equivalent to specie."7 6 There is a
forceful inference that had the defendants proved a currency depreciation at the bill's maturity the difference would have inured
to their benefit, and "[t]hey would [have been] entitled to judgment. for the depreciated value at maturity, payable in the currency of the present day."7

74 Oliver v. Gwin (Commercial Court Records, New Orleans Public Library) (New
Orleans Comm. Ct. 1840), rev'd, 17 La. 28 (1841), reproducedin part in R. KiLBoURNE,
LOUISANA COMMERCIAL LAW: THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD 200-02 (1980).
75 4 La. Ann. 351 (1849).
76 Id. at 351.
77Id.
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More pertinent, perhaps, is the earlier decision of Meeks v.
Davis,7 which permitted the holder of an accepted draft payable
in the notes of a particular bank to recover the value of the notes
at the date of protest. The defendant had tendered the amount in
the notes of the bank subsequent to protest which were "at the
time a discount of from sixty to seventy per cent." 79 Again, the
implication is that had the notes been depreciated on the date of
protest, the holder of the draft could have received no compensation for an erosion of the notes' par value.
Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court showed some
willingness to avoid the most preposterous results of enforcement
of various Mississippi debtor relief statutes. For instance, in the
case of Roberts ex rel. Trustees of the Bank of the United Statesv.
Stark,80 litigation centered on an 1840 Mississippi statute which
prohibited the banks of that state from negotiating evidences of
indebtedness in commerce where the debtors of those banks had
received their bank notes. The legislation practically eliminated
the negotiability of commercial paper in Mississippi and, as the
plaintiff's petition noted, the law probably was in contravention
of the federal constitutional prohibition on a state's passing a law
impairing the obligation of a contract. The plaintiffs petition
further noted:
The object of the act of 1840, was to enable the debtors of
the banks, under all circumstances, to pay their debts in the
notes of the banks.
It cannot be doubted that a tender of either specie or notes, at
the maturity of the notes, would have been a good tender. In
the default of the debtor, perhaps the only remedy of the creditor, in the State of Mississippi, would be an action for damages to be determined, and the value of the bank note in specie, at the maturity of the notes.81
In reviewing the decisions of Mississippi courts relative to the statute's meaning, the Louisiana Supreme Court had occasion to

78 3 Rob. 326 (La. 1842).
79

1Id.at 327.

80 3 La. Ann. 71 (1848).

81 Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).
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quote from an opinion by the chief justice of that state's highest
tribunal:
Bank paper [in Mississippi] was then very much depreciated
and the country was full of this depreciated currency, and it

[the legislation] was designed to secure to debtors the right to
pay the banks in their own notes. By allowing them to transfer
their notes, debtors would have been compelled to pay the endorsees in the constitutional currency.8 2

The Louisiana Supreme Court managed to avoid the task of applying the statute, however, holding that the consideration given
by the plaintiff for the notes was lawful and adequate.
The Mississippi statute received some further elucidation in
the case of Roberts v. Wilkinson. 83 In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court seems to have adopted the position that, once a
debtor was in default on an obligation, he owed the price, not
the value, of current bank notes, "unless he shall have given the
creditor the benefit" of an equivalent to the price. 8 All of the obligations sued on in these cases involved commercial paper made
payable in the "current" funds or notes of particular banks or
banks in a city or region, thus presenting an obvious difficulty for
Louisiana courts in countervailing the tenor of contracts and substituting the specie standard. Where bills were drawn payable in
dollars with no other description, parties likely settled in specie
or its equivalent in currency. Furthermore, some debtors, even
Mississippi ones, felt obliged to redeem their obligations in specie
or its equivalency in current bank notes, regardness of the tenor
of their evidences of indebtedness, in order to preserve their credit rating."'
The earliest case before the Louisiana Supreme Court having
any bearing on the subject of depreciating currencies appears to
be Veeche v. Grayson,86 and it is significant that the court was
called upon to recognize a Kentucky custom, or usage of trade,
82

Id. at 74 (quoting President of Planters Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 7 Miss. (4

S.AM.) 1,5-6 (1844)).
83 5 La. Ann. 369 (1850).
'4 Id. at 378.

85 See Oliver v. Gwin (Commercial Court Records, New Orleans Public Library),
reproducedin partin B. KILBoum, supranote 74, at 200-02.
86 1 Mart. (n.s.) 133 (La. 1823).
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that made "the notes or contracts of individuals, there made [in
Kentucky] to pay money," payable in the notes of the Bank of
Kentucky.8 7 The Louisiana Supreme Court evidently was anxious
to avoid the consequences of forcing creditors to accept tenders of
depreciated currency. The defendant-debtor offered to prove
"that before, at, and ever since the execution of the note, the currency and medium of exchange in Kentucky, where it was executed, consisted of notes of the Bank of Kentucky and its
branches, . . . unless the contract expressly provide[d] for payment in specie; that the note sued upon, had no such provision.""'
When the defendant tendered notes of the Bank of Kentucky,
the plaintiff had refused to accept. Implicit in the Supreme
Court's approval of the district judge's refusal to allow the defendant to prove that such a custom prevailed in Kentucky was a
recognition that the note sued upon was a negotiable instrument,
although the payee had never negotiated it. The Court looked to
the federal constitution, noting that:
[B]y the constitution... Congress has power to coin
money and regulate the value of foreign coins-art. I, sec. 8. It
is therefore to their act we are to recur, in order to ascertain
the value of the American or Spanish dollar. Parol evidence,
therefore, was properly rejected to establish, that the party,
who bound himself to pay nine hundred and seventy-two dollars, intended to promise to pay less than his expressions manifest, when tested by the law of the land. We therefore conclude, the court did not err in rejecting parol testimony, in this
respect."9
The dearth of Louisiana cases in this area suggests that New
Orleans merchants were reluctant to avail themselves of bank
note depreciations, reflecting a keen sensitivity to the personality
component of credit relations. The circumspection of the Louis87 Id. at 134. The Kentucky legislature subsequently passed a statute that recognized
this "custom", which precipitated the case of Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1
(1825), where Chief Justice Marshall enunciated the doctrine of state versus dynamic conformity to state rules of procedure in the federal district courts. See R. KILaoURNE, supra
note 74, at 16-21.
88
89 1 Mart. (n.s.) at 135.
Id. at 137.
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iana Supreme Court in recognizing contrary laws of a foreign
jurisdiction, whether customary or legislatively posited, is apparent when such laws tended to avail debtors of advantageous depreciations in the value of obligations generally. As the Louisiana
High Court observed in 1815:
The federal compact provided that the legislature of no state
should retain the power of maling any thing but gold and silver a tender in the discharge of debts, in order to avert in future the mischiefs resulting from laws imparing the obligation
of a contract to pay gold and silver, by reducing it to an obligation to pay paper. °

E.

Specie and the Civil Code Regulation of Monied Obligations

The supposition that the specie standard subsumed all forms
of commercial paper in the antebellum period follows from a
close analysis of the exceptions, formed by judges and lawmakers, which tended to ameliorate the harshness of convertibility. The legislation regulating damages on bills of exchange protested for non-payment forms an exception to the general commercial jurisprudence that endorser and drawer were responsible
for all consequential damages occasioned by a bill's being protested for non-payment and in particular for damage to the
drawer's credit. The few cases which address the problem of depreciating currencies likewise seem to form exceptions for the

sake of ameliorating hardships.

Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 531, 541 (1815). The court further observed:
Yet the remedy was not commensurate with the evil; the healing process was
therefore continued, in order to prevent the passage of laws impairing the
obligation of a contract to pay to-day, by reducing it to an obligation to pay
on a distant day, or days or indeed any attempt at a legislative interference
between parties to a contract, by favoring either party, to the injury of the
other; and it was provided that no state should pass any law impairing the
obligations of contracts. If the restriction from making anything but gold
and silver a tender in the payment of debts, had not preceded that from
passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts, there might be some,
though very little, ground to say, that the latter clause would have been satisfied by restraining the passage of laws authorising the payment of one
thing instead of another.
Id. at 541-42 (emphasis added).
90
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The import of these reflections for article 1935 of the Louisiana Civil Code should be apparent. That legislation dates from
the 1825 revision which was enacted in contemplation of a commercial code, the projet of which was abandoned by the legislature in 1826. The corresponding article in the 1808 Digest was
very different, allowing an exception where "particular rules of
commerce and suretyship govern the case." 91 Significantly, the
articles in the Commercial Code Projet regulating damages on
bills of exchange protested for non-payment are similar to the act
adopted by the legislature in 1806; thus, article 1935 was subject
to an exception for commercial contracts that was embodied in
the Commercial Code Projet. The failure of the legislature to
adopt the Commercial Code Projet caused the courts to develop
exceptions for commercial contracts where an inflexible provision of the Civil Code would have constituted a burden on interstate commerce. 92 And, in any event, the 1806 statute, subject to
a revision in 1838, remained a legislatively posited exception to
article 1935 throughout the antebellum period.
That article 1935 contemplated pure interest on money contracts is apparent; otherwise, the legislation of palliatives to curb
most pernicious effects of the specie standard are inexplicable.
Perhaps limiting damages on bills of exchange protested for nonpayment and permitting debtors to benefit from depreciating
currencies achieved some measure of justice in an economy
where a depression of value could be ascribed to all forms of
wealth. Besides, the incurrence of long-term obligations was a
practical impossibility. In an economic environment like the
present one, where a depreciating national currency accompanies stability and even appreciation in other forms of wealth
such as real estate, the justice of allowing the value of obligations
negotiated decades ago to plummet to nothing needs to be questioned. Some indexing of relative values may be in order, and, in
any event, article 1935 is not an obstacle to rectifying the worst
abuses of an inflationary economy insofar as it was never intended to cope with a currency that fluctuates in value.
91 LA. CIv. CODE art. 1935 (1870). For an explanation of why the Louisiana Legisla-

ture failed to act on the Commercial Code Projet, see R. KILBOURNE, supra note 74, at 170.
92 See, e.g., Wagner v. Kenner, 2 Rob. 120 (La. 1842).
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CONCLUSION

The singular character of Louisiana's system of commercial
law vis-h-vis the Civil Code was reinforced substantially by both
legislative and judicial recognition of custom and commercial realities as a source of law. Custom contributed immeasurably to
the resolution of latent inconsistencies between two distinct systems of private law whose convergencies and divergencies constituted an essential quality of Louisiana's antebellum jurisprudential heritage. The contractural character of commercial paper in
this context carries a particular significance because negotiability
was grounded in the custom of merchants. As one Supreme
Court justice wrote in 1821:
We would look in vain, in the laws of Spain, for the principles that are to direct us in the transfer of bank paper. Great
Britain and the United States are, perhaps, the only countries
in which it forms the greatest part of the circulation medium,
and in which questions, like that now under consideration,
present themselves.
Since the establishment of banks in Louisiana, their notes
have circulated like the specie which they represent, as generally and freely as in Great Britain and the United States; and
this has insensibly introduced so much of the laws, usage, or
practice of those countries, as is necessary to regulate the mode
in which the affairs of these institutions are transacted, and the
circulation and transfer of their notes; perhaps, rendered obsolete so much of our former laws as is absolutely inconsistent
therewith.

3

Bills of exchange and promissory notes had been negotiated since
the foundation of the colony of Louisiana in the eighteenth century. What the justice was referring to was an expanding facility
for such paper that might emanate from a variety of sources not
exclusively mercantile in origins. Later he would write that:
The circulation of [promissory] notes would be much checked
and embarrassed, if it were believed to be the duty of any person, who receives one, to inquire into the fairness of the transaction in which it originated wherever the signature of a sub-

93 Louisiana Bank v. Bank United States, 9 Mart. 398, 400-01 (1821).
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scribing witness or of a notary afforded the opportunity of doing so.
Since the establishment of banks in this state, vendors have
often found, in the negotiable paper of vendees, a very easy
and speedy mode of receiving the price of property sold on a
credit. The latter, no doubt, found therein some diminution in
the price which would not have been yielded, if the former had
not thereby been enabled to receive their money, before payment was effected by the latter. 4
With regard to negotiability it is especially important to a
characterization of commercial transactions as essentially security oriented in the antebellum period to see the holder-in-duecourse doctrine as a security or enhancement for a bill or note.
Freeing holders of existing equities between maker and drawee
was an incentive to negotiate such paper, just as a particular endorser's signature enhanced the credit value of a bill or note. To
view negotiability in a strictly legal context, however, may obscure important economic dimensions, such as the role of commercial paper as a monetary supplement. Liquid wealth always
is more vulnerable to economic adversity, and in the antebellum
period the absence of a governmentally supported medium of exchange in which to invest no doubt hindered the growth of the liquidity so essential to commercial expansion. Even the most
liquid capitalist was probably illiquid a good part of the time
and, in consequence, very vulnerable when economic conditions
suddenly eroded the value of his commercial paper holdings;
hence, specie supported a very pragmatic psychology.15 It is difficult, therefore, to see negotiability as a judicial or legislative enterprise accomplished at the expense of society as a whole. 9
Public antipathy for negotiable paper was largely a matter of
intraclass tensions, because most people in antebellum America
rarely had an opportunity to discount a promissory note or draw
a bill of exchange. 97 In Louisiana, opposition to the status quo
94 Fusilier v. Bonin, 12 Mart. 235, 238-41 (1822).

95 See generallyJ. CLARK, NEW ORLEANS 1718-1812: AN ECONOMIc HISTORY (1970).
96 For a contrary view, see M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 212-26 (1977).
9' See id.
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usually came from those who objected to the credit-allocation
processes of the regional economy, i.e., that New Orleans factors
monopolized the credit of banks."' It is difficult to equate credit
with social or economic injustice at any time in history, and certainly the exigencies of the antebellum period tended not so
much to affect the cost of credit as its availability.
Nothing in Louisiana's legal history even suggests that the negotiability concept was ever questioned with regard to either bills
of exchange or promissory notes. The earliest statute in the territorial period was enacted in 1804, and begins as follows: "See. 3.
And be it further enacted, That upon all bills of exchange, and
promissory notes made negotiable by law, or by usages and customs of merchants in this territory. . . ." The Louisiana Supreme Court on one occasion elevated all endorsers to the status
of sureties, which certainly enhanced a holder's security, since he
could totally disregard the chain of title and proceed against his
most solvent endorser and collect the whole debt. 100
Louisiana judges certainly were sensitive to the need for
money substitutes, the often deplorable condition of local bank
notes, and the limited credit facilities which could be afforded
the very best business investment, i.e., the commercial transaction. They seem never to have questioned whether commercial
paper was a necessary evil, and one judge actually deplored the
federal government's failure to come to terms with the issue of
what constituted legal tender. 10 Given the overall monetary insufficiencies of the time, the work of the Louisiana judiciary represents a major contribution to economy and savings that benefited the whole community.

98 See G. GREEN, supra note 4, at 28-32.
99 An Act Concerning Bills of Exchange and for other purposes, 1804 Acts of the Ter-
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100Wiggin v. Flower, 5 Rob. 406 (La. 1843).
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